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"Whoever Fights Monsters Should See to It
That in the Process He Does Not Become a
Monster"t: The Necessity of Maintaining
and Narrowing the Welcomeness
Requirement in Sexual Harassment Suits
LEIGH A. SALMON*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1986, the Supreme Court ruled that a hostile work environment was an
actionable claim in sexual harassment suits.t Analogizing discrimination based on sex
to that of discrimination based on race, the Court reasoned that "'a requirement that
a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being
allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the
harshest of racial epithets."' 2 As a result, conduct that does not constitute quid pro
quo sexual harassment but that is equally severe may constitute discrimination under
Title VII.3 The Supreme Court adhered to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") Guidelines4 in defining actionable sexualharassment, stating
that such harassment must be "'[u]nwelcome.' In determining what evidence will
demonstrate a plaintiff's welcomeness, the Court declared that "provocative speech
or dress . .. is obviously relevant." '
This distinctionbetween conduct that is deemed welcoming of sexual advances and
conduct that demonstrates the advances were unwelcome is important primarily
because, depending on how district courts rule on the evidentiary issue of that
conduct, the outcome of the case could hinge on the admissibility of such evidence.
Not only does the admissibility issue determine the "simple" outcome (that is,
whether the plaintiff or the defendant wins), it is also determinative of whether the
"correct," or deserving, party will ultimately prevail.
t Inspiration for title from Jodlle Anne Moreno, "Whoever Fights Monsters Should See
to It That in the Process He Does Not Become a Monster": Hunting the Sexual Predator with
SilverBullets-FederalRulesofEvidence4l3-415-anda Stake Through theHeart-Kansas
v. Hendricks, 49 FLA. L. REv. 505, 505 (1997) (quoting FRIEDRICH W. NIETZSCHE, BEYOND
GOOD AND EvIL 89 (Walter Kaufinann trans., Vintage Books 1989) (1886)).
* J.D. Candidate, 2002, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1998,
University of Southern Mississippi. I would like to thank my family and friends for their
unconditional love and steadfast support throughout law school. A special thanks is in order
for Mindy Finnigan, John Davis, and Holli Gottschall who have each provided his or her own
special version of insight and love. Also, I would like to express my appreciation to Professor
Julia Lamber for her guidance in helping me select a topic for this Note and her comments and
suggestions on earlier drafts.
1. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,64-66 (1986).
2. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11 th Cir. 1982)).
3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-2 (2001); see also
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
4. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1985).
5. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1985)).
6. Id. at 69.
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In addition to affecting the outcome of the trial, admitting evidence of provocative
speech and dress presupposes that sexual desire is an essential element of sexual
harassment, raising deeper, competing policy issues. Just as in rape trials, admitting
evidence of provocative behavior and dress will infuse the trial with the issue of
sexual desire, shifingthe focus away fromthe heart of the issue-was the workplace
so hostile as to discriminate-and placing blame on the plaintiff.7 Similarly, just as
in rape trials, the defendant of a sexual harassment suit has an interest in defending
against the claim by presenting evidence of the victim's conduct that would prove
consent. Whether the correct logical analysis and policy determinations are being
made in ruling on these evidentiary and admissibility matters will affect the answers
to all of these issues.
Courts have misconstrued the welcomeness requirement, adding subj ectivityprongs
and analysis that tend to channel the inquiry into issues of sexual desire and
promiscuity. As a result, some commentators have advocated abolishing the
welcomeness requirement altogether. This Note will argue that not only is that
unnecessary, but it would not achieve just results for all parties involved. Rather, the
welcomeness requirement, as set out in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,' and the
"subjectively offended" requirement, as set out in Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc.,9
when properly construed and limited so as to avoid the confusion of sexual desire and
implication of a workplace code of conduct, would achieve the most just results.
Part II.A. of this Note examines the underlying principle for the Court's decision
in Meritor, outlining the mandate and rationale behind the welcomeness requirement
as an evidentiary issue. Part II.B. looks at the Federal Rules of Evidence, discussing
the enactment and subsequent amendments to Rule 412, also known as the Rape
Shield Rule, and the policy goals behind that enactment. Part I then analyzes cases
that were decided after both Meritor and the amendments to Rule 412, looking at the
impact of both welcomeness and Rule 412 on sexual harassment suits and how these
two competing objectives are interpreted and implemented by federal district courts.
More specifically, in looking at those district court decisions, this Note will examine
what questions the courts are attempting to address in asking whether to admit
evidence pertaining to a plaintiff's dress or sexual behavior and what effect those
questions have on the outcome of each case. Part HII also looks at the more recent
Supreme Court decision in Harris and discusses how the addition of the subjectively
offended requirement interplays with welcomeness and reasons that while those are
the correct questions to ask, the manner in which the courts are asking them is
incorrect. Finally, this Note will argue that continuing to address the issue of
welcomeness is compatible, and in fact, desirable, when attempting to shift the focus
away from sexual desire.
7. See Paul N. Monnin, Proving Welcomeness: The Admissibility of Evidence of Sexual
History in Sexual Harassment Claims Under the 1994 Amendments to Federal Rule of
Evidence 412, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1155, 1156 (1995) ("They want to show that the plaintiff is
a nut or a slut."' (quoting Ellen E. Schultz & Junda Woo, The Bedroom Ploy, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 19, 1994, at Al (quoting attorney Phillip Kay)).
8. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
9. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
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I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
In 1986, the Supreme Court decided Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, °
incorporating the welcomeness requirement into the sexual harassment analysis. Part
H.A. of this Note outlines the Court's ruling in that case. Part H.B. analyzes how the
Federal Rules of Evidence interplay with the Court's holding, especially after the
enactment of, and subsequent amendments to, the Rape Shield Rule.
A. Meritor and the Gravamen of Sexual Harassment
Duringher four years of employment with MeritorSavings Bank, plaintiffMichelle
Vinson ("Vinson") claimed that "she had 'constantly been subjected to sexual
harassment' by [her supervisor] in violation of Title V."" Specifically, Vinson
stated that her supervisor repeatedly requested that she engage in sexual intercourse
with him, requests which she initially refused. 2 After some period of time, however,
"she eventually agreed" to sexual intercourse.'3 In addition to the requests for sexual
intercourse, Vinson's supervisor "fondled her in front of other employees, followed
her into the women's restroom... exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped
her on several occasions."'4 She further "testified that because she was afraid of [her
supervisor] she never reported his harassment to any of his supervisors and never
attempted to use the bank's complaint procedure."'"
In evaluating Vinson's Title VII claim of sexual harassment, the district court
denied relief, stating that if there was "an intimate or sexual relationship" between
Vinson and her supervisor, that relationship was voluntary and had nothing to do with
her employment at the bank. " The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court's decision,
stating that if Vinson's supervisor "'made Vinson's toleration of sexual harassment
a condition of her employment,' her voluntariness 'had no materiality whatsoever.....
The court went on to say that "'the voluminous testimony regarding Vinson's dress
and personal fantasies' ... 'had no place in [the] litigation."'".8
In acknowledging the new hostile environment sexual harassment cause of action,
the Supreme Court stated that in order to have a cause of action, the conduct "must
be sufficiently severe or pervasive [as] 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment and create an abusive working environment.""' 9 As such, single,
"[i]solated or casual occurrences alone," will not suffice.2" Rather, the conduct must
be judged from "the totality of [the] circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual
10. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
11. Id. at 59.
12. Id. at 60.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 61.
16. Id. (quoting Vinson v. Taylor, 1980 WL 100, *7 (D.D.C. 1980)).
17. Id. at 62-63 (quoting Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
18. Id. at 63 (quoting Vinson, 753 F.2d at 146 n.36).
19. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1 Ith Cir. 1982)).
20. Casey J. Wood, Note, "Inviting Sexual Harassment": The Absurdity of the
Welcomeness Requirement in Sexual Harassment Law, 38 BRANDEIs L.L 423,425 (2000).
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advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred."'" As a result,
"'[t]he workplace that is actionable is the one that is 'hellish.""'
The Court, however, did not end its discussion with the totality of the
circumstances. Rather, it went on to state that "[t]he gravamen of any sexual
harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome,"' as opposed
to being voluntary.' The Court stated that the district court's emphasis on the
voluntariness of the conduct, "in the sense that the complainant was not forced to
participate against her will," was erroneously placed.24 While it is not entirely clear
based on the text of the opinion exactly what the Court had in mind while making this
distinction between welcome and voluntary conduct, it appears that the Court was
concerned with allowing claims of sexual harassment for situations that fell short of
rape while still allowing for a defense to the situation in which the plaintiff
welcomed or wished to engage in the complained of sexual conduct.
While the Court conceded that this requirement of welcomeness26 would present
"difficult problems of proof," it offered no solutions regarding what evidence should
be admitted in the determination, except to state that "a complainant's sexually
provocative speech or dress. ., is obviously relevant." 7 Some might think that "if.
.the employee demonstrates by word or deed that the 'harassment' is welcome,"
then it cannot be said to be harassment at all.28 As a result, the question of what
constitutes actionable harassment appears deceptively simple. However, "[the] courts
are still provided with little to no guidance in determining exactly what evidence will
conclusively establish welcomeness."" Despite this lack, or perhaps, as a result of
this lack of guidance, Title VII sexual harassment cases continue to turn specifically
on the issue of welcomeness.
B. The 1994 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence
In dealing with evidentiary matters and determining the admissibility of key
evidence, the Federal Rules of Evidence "place explicit discretion with the trial judge
21. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (b) (1985)).
22. Wood, supra note 20, at 425 (quoting Perry v. Harris Chemin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010,
1013 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Baskervillev. Culligan Int'l, 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995))).
23. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
24. Id.
25. The term "rape"is used here to indicate the presence ofphysical compulsion. Arguably,
allowing a defense of a plaintiff having "voluntarily" engaged in the conduct would exclude
the vast majority of sexual harassment cases, as many plaintiffs will engage in the conduct of
their own free will out of a fear of retaliation for not doing so. That raises the question of
whether such conduct can truly be called "voluntary," but that issue is beyond the scope of this
Note.
26. The welcomeness requirement, as interpreted by the courts, would be more accurately
described as the unwelcomeness requirement, since it requires the plaintiff to affirmatively
prove that she did not welcome harassment. However, since the courts refer to it as the
welcomeness requirement, I will continue to use that term.
27. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68-69 (emphasis added).
28. Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., General Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1008-09 (7th
Cir. 1994) (citing Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 486-87 (7th Cir. 1991)).
29. Wood, supra note 20, at 427 (emphasis added);
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to determine specific issues."' At a bare minimum, the trial judge must determine
that the evidence sought to be admitted is relevant to the case at hand,31 as
"[e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible."32 In order to be relevant, the
evidence must "[have] any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence."33 Thus, the standard under which evidence is to
be admitted is if the fact to be proven is "more... probable than it would be without
the evidence." This is an exceedingly low standard, such that"[a]Imost anythingthat
a rational lawyer would attempt to offer into evidence would be 'relevant' within the
meaning of [the] Rule."' Because of this extreme leniency, Rule 403 imposes a
balancing test for all relevant evidence." Under this general rule, "evidence maybe
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury."'37 While Rule 403 is
considered the "universal 'fall-back"'" for excluding evidence, it is still slanted to
admitting evidence, as any prejudice must substantially outweigh the probative
value.3
9
In 1978, Congress amendedRule 412 ofthe Federal Rules offEvidence, also known
as the Rape Shield Rule, which served to substantially reduce the kind of evidence
that could be admitted in a rape trial.' Specifically, legislators wanted to limit the
evidence of a victim's prior sexual conduct that was being admitted for the purpose
of demonstrating a propensity towards such conduct, and thus making it more likely
than not that the victim consented.41 This rule, however, only dealt with criminal
trials, "[spelling] out when, and under what conditions, evidence of a rape victim's
prior sexual behavior would be admitted." 2 The "principal purpose of Rule 412 was
'to protect rape victims from the degrading and embarrassing disclosure of intimate
details about their private lives."" Civil actions involving sexual misconduct were
not included anywhere in the rule.
In 1994, Congress amended the Federal Rule of Evidence 412 to include civil
actions. The amendments sought "to diminish some of the confusion engendered by
the original rule and to expand the protection afforded alleged victims of sexual
30. ROGERC. PARKETAL,EVIDENCE LAW: A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE LAW OFEVIDENCE
AS APPLIED IN AMERICAN TRIALS § 1.04, at 12 (1998).
31. See FED. R. EVID. 401.
32. FED. R. EviD. 402.
33. FED. R. EvID. 401.
34. Id.
35. PARK, supra note 31, § 5.01, at 124.
36. FED. R. Evit. 403.
37. Id.
38. PARK, supra note 31, § 5.04, at 129.
39. See FED. R. EviD. 403.
40. See Kevin C. Klein, Evidentiary Hurdles in Defending Sexual Harassment Suits:
Amended Rule 412 and Rule 415 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 715, 723 (2000).
41. See FED. R. EviD. 412 advisory committee's note.
42. Klein, supra note 40, at 723.
43. Id. at 724 (quoting 124 Cong. Rec. HI 1,944 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1978) (statement of
Rep. Mann of South Carolina) quoted in FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note).
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misconduct," as well as to prevent the type of evidence frombeing admitted that had
previouslybeen admitted under the pure welcomeness standard in sexual harassment
suits.45 This amended version of Rule 412 was passed despite objections by the
Supreme Court, which was concerned that the amended version would "'encroach on
the rights of defendants"'" by preventing them from presenting a complete defense
to claims of sexual misconduct.
The stated goals of Rule 412 are "to safeguard the alleged victim against the
invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is
associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details and the infusion of sexual
innuendo into the factf'mding [sic] process."47 Adding sexual harassment and civil
cases generally to the purview of Rule 412 helps further these policy goals, regardless
of the nature of the sexual offense.
Thus, in deciding the admissibility of dress and conduct evidence in a sexual
harassment suit, Rule 40146 applies as an initial gatekeeper,49 but the balancing
established in Rule 403' is reversed and supplanted by Rule 412. Rule 412(a) states
that "[e]vidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual
behavior [or] ... to prove any alleged victim's sexualpredisposition" is inadmissible
unless it falls under the exceptions stated in subpart (b).5  Subpart (b)(2) states that
evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior"' or sexual predisposition of any
44. FED. R. EvID. 412 advisory committee's note.
45. Andrea A. Curcio, Rule 412 Laid Bare: A Procedural Rule That Cannot Adequately
Protect Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs from Embarrassing Exposure, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 125,
126-27 (1998).
46. Klein, supra note 40, at 724 (quoting Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
to the Honorable John F. Gerry, Chair of the Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference
of the United States (Apr. 29, 1984), reprinted in COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHIEF JUSTICE,
THE SUPREME COURTOFTHE UNITED STATES, TRANSM1TnNG AN AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE, AS ADOPTED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, PURSUANT TO 28
U.S.C. § 2076, H.R. Doc.No. 103-250 (1994)). Nevertheless, Congress passed the amendment,
and Rule 412 now covers both criminal and civil proceedings. In fact, the Notes of the
Advisory Committee specifically state that sexual harassment will be covered under Rule
412(b)(2) and (c). See FED. R. EviD. 412 advisory committee's note.
47. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
48. Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs relevancy and states that
"'[r]elevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EID. 401.
49. If the evidence sought to be admitted is not relevant to the issue at hand, the inquiry
never advances to the Rule 412 analysis. See, e.g., Howard v. Historic Tours of Am., 177
F.R.D. 48, 51-53 (D.D.C. 1997) (holding that"the defendants fail[ed] the first test imposed by
[Rule 412(b)(2)], establishing that plaintiff's sexual behavior with other employees is
'otherwise admissible,' i.e., relevant under [Rule 401]").
50. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the exclusion of relevant evidence
based on unfair prejudice and states that relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ... ." FED. R. EVID. 403.
51. FED. R. EViD 412(a)(l)-(2).
52. "Behavior" is defined in the Notes of the Advisory Committee as "all activities that
involve actual physical conduct, i.e. sexual intercourse and sexual contact," or that imply
[Vol. 77:615
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alleged victim is admissible ifit is otherwise admissible under these rules and
its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim
and of unfair prejudice to any party. Evidence of an alleged victim's
reputation is admissible only ifit has been placed in controversyby the alleged
victim.
53
The Rule's balancing test is the opposite of that required by Rule 403. Under Rule
412, in civil cases theparty seeang to admit evidence of the sexual predisposition of
the alleged victim must demonstrate that the probative value of the evidence
outweighs any unfair prejudice.' In contrast, under Rule 403, the party opposing the
entry of evidence must show that the unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the
probative value.5 According to the drafters, these amendments to Rule 412 were to
make the requirements for admission "more stringent than in the original rule,"' 6 and
perhaps be used to avoid disturbing decisions, such as the Seventh Circuit's in Reed
v. Shepard.'
In Reed, the plaintiff was employed with a county sheriffs department as a
"'civilianjailer."'"8 The atmosphere ofher employment was described by the Seventh
Circuit as "[resembling] a combination of a modem version of TV's Barney Miller,
with the typically raunchy language and activities of an R-rated movie, and the antics
imagined in a high-school locker room."59 In addition to what the court described as
an "unprofessional atmosphere," the plaintiff asserted
that she was handcuffed to the drunk tank and sally port doors, that she was
subjected to suggestive remarks..., that conversations often centered around
oral sex, that she was physically hit and punched in the kidneys, that her head
was grabbed and forcefully placed in members laps, and that she was the
subject of lewd jokes and remarks. She testified that she had chairs pulled out
from under her, a cattle prod with an electrical shock was placed between her
legs, and they frequently tickled her. She was placed in a laundry basket,
handcuffed inside an elevator, handcuffed to the toilet and her face pushed
into the water, and maced.o
To all of this, the court responded by stating that "[b]y any objective standard, the
behavior.., was, to say the least, repulsive." ' The court, however, found that it did
sexual intercourse or sexual contact. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note. "In
addition, the word 'behavior' should be construed to include activities of the mind, such as
fantasies or dreams." Id.
53. FED. R. EviD. 412(b)(2) (emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. FED. R. EviD. 403.
56. FED. R. EvID. 412 advisory committee's notes.
57. 939 F.2d 484, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that the plaintiff welcomed extreme
physical and sexual harassment because she engaged in sexual banter and gift giving).
58. Id. at 485.





not constitute sexual harassment under Title VII because "[Reed] was a willing and
welcomeparticipant."62 Heruse ofsexualbanter, vulgarvocabulary, and occasionally
not wearing a bra under her t-shirt' showed that the "language and sexually explicit
jokes were used around [her] because of her personality rather than her sex,"'
indicating that not only had she welcomed or invited such behavior, but also that the
harassment could not have been "based on 'sex."' 65
If the 1994 Amendments to Rule 412 hadbeen in place at the time of this decision,
perhaps a different result would have been reached. However, even while claiming
"to diminish some of the confusion ... [and] expand the protection afforded to
alleged victims of sexual misconduct,"' the Notes of the Advisory Committee to the
1994 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Evidence admit that "[i]n an action for
sexual harassment .... some evidence of the alleged victim's sexual behavior and/or
predisposition in the workplace may perhaps be relevant."67 As a result, Rule 412
would have served to restrict the amount and type of evidence admitted, but it would
not have answered the question-for what purpose that evidence was being
used-thus leaving loopholes for defendants. If the court in Reed had used Rule 412
in conjunction with a narrower version of Meritor's welcomeness requirement, it
would have been able to focus on the conduct specifically between the plaintiff and
the defendant, and thereby could reasonably conclude that the plaintiff, despite her
flirtations, did not welcome her harassers' abusive conduct.
III. THE CASES: POST-MERITOR AND AMENDED RuLE 412
After the Supreme Court decision in Meritor and the amendments to Rule 412,
there is still a need for guidance to the lower courts in determining what constitutes
"welcomeness" in hostile work environment sexual harassment suits and how to
determine what evidence is admissible and what is not. Rule 412 does provide some
guidelines for determining what evidence is admissible and for what purpose. The
Rule states that in civil cases evidence is admissible to prove sexual predisposition,
and as a result, welcomeness."' Beyond this, however, the Rule provides little
guidance, and thus the lower courts are all over the spectrum with respect to what is
deemed relevant and, therefore, admissible. Determining what behavior clearly
establishes unwelcomeness is as murky as ever, and there is anything but a national
consensus on the matter.
A. The Extreme Cases: Pretending Rule 412 Does Not Exist
There are two basic types of cases at this end of the continuum. First, there are
cases that indirectly ignore Rule 412 by improperly applying the balancing test.
Second, there are those that directly ignore Rule 412 by simply admitting all evidence
62. Id. at 487, 491.
63. Id. at 487.
64. Id. at 491-92.
65. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
66. FED. R. EviD. 412 advisory committee's note.
67. Id. (citing Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 962-63 (8th Cir. 1993)).
68. FED. R. Evil. 412(b)(2).
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about plaintiffs' sexual behavior or workplace antics that passes the bare minimum
ofrelevancyrequirements under Rules 401 and 402.69 In both instances, these courts
admit evidence under the theory that the admitted evidence will demonstrate whether
the plaintiffwas in fact subjectively offended 7 or whether she actually welcomed the
defendant's harassing behavior.
The first type of case (indirectly ignoring Rule 412), for example, is illustrated by
Sublette v. Glidden Co."' In this case, the plaintiff filed a motion in limine to exclude
certain evidence pertaining to her sexual conduct. 2 Specifically, the plaintiff sought
to exclude her general workplace conduct, such as her use of vulgar language, her
discussions of "her intimate relations with her husband," use of sexual innuendo, and
provocative touching of other male coworkers. 3 There was no indication that her
conduct in anyway involved or was directed at the particular coworkers and
supervisors (named in her complaint) who repeatedly requested her to perform oral
sex on them, "made comments about her breasts, disparaged the work performance
of female workers, and [claimed] that a sketch of [her] performing oral sex was
etched in the men's bathroom." 4
In relying on a Fourth Circuit decision, the court determined that it was the
plaintiff's burden to demonstrate the advances were in fact unwelcome, and that any
"evidence of alleged sexual conduct of the [p]laintiff [was] relevant... [in order to]
form a basis for finding that the [p]Ilaintiff welcomed the conduct complained of."'75
In considering under Rule 412 the evidence regarding plaintiff s workplace behavior
with other coworkers, the court stated that "[1]imiting evidence to the conduct
involving the alleged harassers or conduct which the alleged harassers could have
taken as welcoming their advances... would undermine the Meritor holding that a
trier of fact should consider the whole picture."'76 Thus, according to this court's
rationale, the inquiry does not stop with whatever conduct on the part of the plaintiff
the harassers could perceive as welcoming their sexually harassing conduct. Instead,
it gives defendants free reign to introduce any evidence that, while tending to show
welcomeness between plaintiff and another person, has no relevance to demonstrate
welcomeness with respect to the alleged harasser himself. The rationale behind this
ruling essentially ignores the mandates of Rule 412 while purporting to apply it.
The same court in Fedio v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,' in ruling on a motion for new
trial, reasoned that having admitted evidence regarding the plaintiffs past sexual
history was proper because the plaintiff won the trial. 8 The manager of the store in
which the plaintiff worked made comments such as "women who are old enough to
bleed are young enough to butcher."' 9 Additionally, the manager made repeated
69. FED. R. EvID. 401, 402.
70. See infra Part IV.C.
71. No. CIV.A.97-CV-5047, 1998 WL 964189, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 1998).
72. Id.
73. Id. at *1 -2.
74. Id. at *2.
75. Id. at *3 (citing Swintek v. U.S. Air, Inc., 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987)).
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. No. CIV.A.97-5851, 1998 WL 966000, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 1998).
78. Id.
79. Id. at *1.
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comments about oral sex, told the plaintiff that "her skirt was not short enough[,]...
that [she probably] taste[d] great," and that she should pose as a centerfold in a
magazine." In herposttrialmotion, the plaintiffasserted that evidence concerning her
sexual relations outside of the workplace, an isolated statement made at work that
"she was going to wear a finger ring until she 'got laid,"' and that she had been a
victim of date rape prior to her employment with the defendant should have been
excluded under Rule 412."' In ruling on the plaintiff s motion, the court concluded
that the evidence was in fact admissible because not only did "the probative value of
such evidence substantially outweigh[ ] [any] prejudicial effect on the [p]laintiff," but
the "[p]laintiff ultimately prevailed in [the] litigation," something which, according
to the court, demonstrated that it was in fact correct in its balancing.' The court went
on to note that "[t]o allow an alleged victim to publicly flaunt her sexual behaviors
and yet remain protected by Rule 412 would be tantamount to a complete disregard
of the [R]ule's purpose." 3 The court apparently believed that, because the plaintiff
discussed "her sexual proclivities" 4 with her coworkers on a few occasions, she was
no longer entitled to the protection of Rule 412, or even to the more narrow inquiry
ofwelcomeness as opposed to the determination of how offended she actually was. 5
After admitting all of the evidence damaging to the plaintiff, the court proceeded
to consider the admissibility of the plaintiff s evidence. In particular, the plaintiffhad
sought to introduce evidence of a rumor that one of her coworkers circulated about
the plaintiff, saying that she wore "short dresses with no undergarments and exposed
herself to coworkers."" The plaintiff had hoped to introduce evidence of this rumor
to demonstrate the overall hostility of the workplace.8 7 The court ruled the evidence
of the rumor was inadmissible because "the alleged source of the rumor... had no
supervisory authority over [the] [p]laintiff.""8 The court also noted that because the
rumor "was a one-time occurrence[,] and therefore not 'pervasive and regular,"' it
could not be admitted into evidence. 9 Not only does it appear that the court applied
a double standard, but the logic seems to run contrary to the mandates in both
Meritor? andHarris91-- mandates that the issues ofwelcomeness and overall hostility
be judged by the "totality of the circumstances," to include minor, isolated incidents,
80. Id.
81. Id. at "5.
82. Id. at *6.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. The court notes later in the opinion that the correct inquiry is not how offended the
plaintiff actually was, but rather whether or not"the discrimination would detrimentally affect
a reasonable person ofthe same sex in that position." Id. at *7 (citing Bonenberger v. Plymouth
Township, 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997)).
86. Id. at *2.
87. Id. at *5.
88. Id. at *7.
89. Id.
90. Mentor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986) (holding that "the trier of fact
must determine the existence of sexual harassment in light of 'the record as a whole' and 'the
totality of circumstances") (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (b) (1985)).
91. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) ("[W]hether an environment is
'hostile' or 'abusive' can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances.").
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that, while insufficient alone, are quite significant when considered in the aggregate. 92
While the court did purport to use Rule 412 and the plaintiff did ultimately prevail
in her claim, the logic the court used to determine the admissibility of the evidence
is unsettling for a number of reasons. First, questions of admissibility do not turn on
who wins or loses the case. If the evidence had a more damaging effect on the
plaintiff's case, the court would not have ruled any differently on its admissibility.
Interestingly enough, while the court rested its laurels on the fact that "the [plaintiff
ultimately prevailed in [the] litigation"93 as justification for the admissibility of
damaging evidence, the jury actually found that the plaintiff had not proven "a
gender-based hostile work environment."9' Rather, the plaintiff prevailedbecause the
jury found that the defendant had retaliated against the plaintiff for having "[made]
complaints about [the defendant's] sexually-hostile conduct in the workplace.""5 In
reaching this conclusion, the jury considered the very evidence the court claimed had
no prejudicial effect on the plaintiff in allowing her to win the case.
Second, and perhaps more important, this opinion will set a precedent for other
courts to follow, as both persuasive and binding authority. Even if the opinion is only
followed for its logic as representative of how hostile work environment sexual
harassment cases should be decided, the effect will be damaging to plaintiffs, who are
justified in bringing such suits, but perhaps have engaged in willing sexual banter
with employees other than the alleged harasser. Thus, if courts do follow this line of
logic, the focus will be on evidence of plaintiffs' behavior having no bearing on
whether or not they welcomed the particular complained-of harassing conduct. This
will have the result of deterring plaintiffs from bringing legitimate Title VII sexual
harassment suits out of fear of in-depth inquiries into their private sexual conduct.
The second line of cases at this end of the spectrum are those that simply reverse
the balancing prescribed by Rule 412, effectively ignoring the Rule altogether, and
follow the reversed balancing test as set out in Rule 403, so that the unfair prejudice
must substantially outweigh the probative value.' In Beard v. Flying J., Inc.,97 the
court correctly notes that evidence "is admissible if it is otherwise admissible under
[the] rules [sic] and its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm
to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party."9" However, when the court
discussed the admissibility of the evidence in question, namely "issues of workplace
sexual conduct," the court admitted the evidence because "the probative value of this
92. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338,347 (2d Cir. 1998) (overruling a motion
for summary judgment for the defendant because "[all of the circumstances must be
considered') (emphasis added); Woodard v. Metro I.P.T.C., No. IP 98-646-C RIG, 2000 WL
684101, at *10 (S.D. Ind. March 16, 2000) ("[TJhe issue 'should be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position, considering 'all of the
circumstances." This analysis includes considering 'the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance."'
(internal citations omitted)).
93. Fedio, 1998 WL 966000, at *6.
94. Id. at *2.
95. Id.
96. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
97. 116 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (S.D. Iowa 2000).
98. Id. at 1084 (quoting FED. R. Evm. 412(b)(2)) (emphasis added).
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evidence was not "ubstantially outweighed by any harm or prejudice that may have
resulted." In other words, the court ignored Rule 412, reverting to a straight Rule
403 inquiry, asking if the harm substantially outweighed the probative value instead
of vice versa. The court asserted that because the plaintiff claimed "that [the
defendant] created an 'unwanted' sexually offensive environment, [the plaintiff] has
placed in controversy [the] issues of workplace sexual conduct."' "° Specifically, the
court maintained that the "evidence was relevant to the claim of a sexually hostile
work environment""'0°
Under this reasoning, any time a plaintiff brings forth a claim of hostile work
environment sexual harassment, simply by filing the initial complaint, the plaintiff
would be deemed to have placed her reputation into controversy, thus completely
subverting the protections of Rule 412, and thrusting the inquiry back to the very
basics of Meritor and welcomeness. The fact that the evidence in Beard did not
extend beyond the workplace is of little comfort given the court's rationale. 2 The
court did give lip service to the notion of relevance by citing Burns v. McGregor
Electric Industry, for the proposition that "posing nude for a magazine outside work
hours is not relevant to the issue of unwelcome sexually harassing conduct at
work." 3 However, given the court's reversal of Rule 412's balancing requirements
and seemingly nonchalant treatment of what constitutes placing the plaintiffs
reputation into controversy, this citation does not instill much confidence. 4 It is not
difficult to imagine a situation in which evidence of the plaintiff's reputation, based
on incidents that occurred outside of the workplace, would be entered into the record
as evidence of the plaintiff's willingness and welcoming of the harasser's sexual
advances.
B. The More Balanced Approach-Focusing on the
Conduct Between Plaintiff and Defendant
While no court excludes all evidence pertaining to welcomeness under Rule 4 12 ,'QS
the courts that fall more in the middle have placed severe restrictions on what may be
admitted and what mustbe excluded. Perhaps the most determined in its protection
of sexual harassment plaintiffs was the court in Howard v. Historic Tours of
99. Id. at 1085-86 (emphasis added). The plaintiff had made a motion for a new trial, in
part, on the grounds that certain evidence should have been excluded under Rule 412. Id. The
court said that the admission of the evidence was "harmless error," and even if it "were to reach
the merits of Plaintiff's Rule 412 argument, the [c]ourt would not order a new trial," as she
placed some of the evidence in controversy herself. Id.
100. Id. at 1085 (citing FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2)) ("Evidence of an alleged victim's
reputation is admissible only if it has been placed into controversy by the alleged victim.")
(internal citations omitted).
101. Id. at 1086.
102. Id. ("[T]he admission of evidence was limited solely to certain instances of Plaintiff's
workplace conduct, and did not extend to her non-workplace behavior.").
103. Id. (citing Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 962-63 (8th Cir. 1993)).
104. Id. at 1085-86.
105. Such an exclusion would arguably constitute the opposite extreme end of the
continuum.
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America."° In Howard, the court was asked to rule on whether the plaintiffs could
be compelled to answer certain interrogatories during discovery."' The
interrogatories pertained to whether the plaintiffs had sexual relations with any ofthe
defendant's employees, regardless of whether or not those sexual relations were with
someone who had harassed them or whether the alleged harassers knew of the sexual
relations.1'0 The defendant's "[tlheory of [a]dmissibility"' 9 centered on the notion
that "they [had] the right to present evidence [about] the plaintiffs' voluntary sexual
affair with [other] coworkers ... so that thejury [could] determine whether the named
employees reasonably believed that their sexual advances were welcome."'" 0
In evaluating that claim, the court pointed out that sexual behavior between the
plaintiffs and employees other than the alleged harassers could "be construed as
welcoming the harassing conduct complained of only if the harassing employees
knew of it."' Without limiting the information defendants sought to obtain to that
which the harassers could have reasonably known of or construed to be welcoming,
"it is impossible for the information sought to be relevant, (or lead to relevant
evidence),""' and therefore would fall outside of the scope of discovery. The court
speculated that even if the "defendants were to garrow the question and ask [the]
plaintiffs only if they engaged in sexual conduct with other employees and had reason
to believe that the harassing employees knew of that behavior," the information
sought would still be irrelevant.1" According to the court, "[s]uch proof has probative
force only if the proposition that their knowledge that she engaged in such behavior
made it more reasonable for them to conclude that she would welcome their sexual
advances becomes easier to accept than it would be without that proof."' "4 The court
continued:
To so conclude one would have to say that knowledge of a woman's engaging
in a consensual relationship with a co-worker makes reasonable the perception
that she welcomed other sexual advances at her place of employment ....
While such a perception might have been justified in Victorian England and
Wharton's "Age oflnnocence" in America, when men discriminated between
the women they married and the women they slept with, it has nothing to do
with America in 1997.1 s
106. 177 F.R.D. 48 (D.D.C. 1997). The plaintiffs in Howard sued under the D.C. Human
Rights Act, D.C. Code § 2000e-2(a)(1). Id. at 51. The court, however, noted that the D.C.
Human Rights Act is similar to Title VII and analyzed the evidence issues according to
Supreme Court doctrine in Title VII cases. Id.
107. Id. at 48-49.
108. Id. at 50.
109. Id. at 51. In order to conduct discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e),
the information sought must "be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence, even if the information itself is not admissible at trial." Id. at 50 (emphasis added).








According to the court, unless "the harassing employees knew or had reason to
know" of certain behavior or interactions, the information sought by the defendants
"[could not] possibly be relevant to whether those employees thought the plaintiffs
would welcome their advances."'" 6 Even if the harassers knew of the behavior, then
it would still not be relevant, because "the probative force" would be based on the
same "illogical" premises quoted above." As a result, the only type of evidence
admissible under this court's logic would be evidence of interactions directly between
the plaintiff and the alleged harassers.
Another district court arrived at a similar conclusion in its analysis, though
ultimately reaching a different result, in Woodard v. Metro Indianapolis Public
Transportation Corp. "s In Woodard, theplaintiffclaimed that she hadbeen subjected
to sexual harassment by coworkers and supervisors alike, allegedly leading to her
being fired in retaliation for having filed complaints."9 In evaluating the plaintiff's
complaints, the court looked at the conduct specifically between the plaintiff and the
alleged harasser2 in determining whether that conduct was welcome.'2' In so doing,
the court noted that "[t]he record contain[ed] extensive undisputed evidence of [the
plaintiffs] own initiation of and participation in sexual banter and teasing, and even
[described] her efforts while on the job at Metro to attract other Metro employees as
customers for her private $40 'lingerie shows,"' some of which were specifically
targeted at the alleged harasser." As a result, looking only at the evidence of conduct
that occurred between the alleged harasser and the plaintiff, it is not unreasonable to
conclude that the plaintiff welcomed the very harassing behavior of which she
complained. The court stated that prior to her affirmatively stating that she no longer
welcomed such sexual banter, "[the defendant did not act] unreasonably in failing to
distinguish ... between conduct that [the plaintiff] initiated or at least found
welcome, and.. conduct she found unwelcome. '""3
Both Howard and Woodardshare one main focal point. Both cases focus primarily
on the relationship between the alleged harasser and the plaintiff, as opposed to
conduct generally or conduct that would have no bearing on that relationship. While
the court in Woodard did consider far more "damaging" evidence than did the court
in Howard, this difference is explained by the fact that the plaintiff in Woodard
injected her sexuality into the workplace in a far more extreme manner. In fact, the
plaintiff in Woodard went so far as to circulate nude photos of herself, specifically
116. Id. at 53.
117. Id.
118. No. IP 98-646-C H/G, 2000 WL 684101, at *1 (S.D. Ind. March 16,2000) (ruling for
defendants in a motion for summaryjudgment and noting that the "case presents truly meritless
allegations of sexual harassment").
119. Id.
120. Originally, there were several individual defendants listed as having allegedly harassed
the plaintiff. Id. at *2. However, some of the defendants were not named in the requisite EEOC
complaint, and as a result, were not considered as part of the suit. Id. Of the other named
defendants, only the conduct of one was deemed to have risen to the level of being objectively
sexually hostile. Id. at *11. As a result, it is only with that one remaining defendant that the
issue of welcomeness was seriously at issue.
121. Id. at *13.
122. Id. at *12-13.
123. Id. at *13.
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showing these photos to her alleged harassers." Also in alignment withHoward, the
court in Woodardconsideredtheplaintiff's method of dress.'25 Even though the focus
is on the conduct between the plaintiff and the alleged harasser, "one supposes...
all the employees [including the alleged harassers] could see" extremely provocative
dress, and therefore could make the rational assumption, however erroneous it may
be, that the plaintiff would not be opposed to sexual banter or advances." 6
It is one thing to be a sexual being in the workplace in the sense that a plaintiff
chooses to engage in sexual'banter with one person in particular or even some
coworkers, generally. It is another to then make the assumption that based on a
plaintiff's interactions with those specific persons, she then necessarily accepts the
advances and harassment of all. If that sexual behavior is with the actual defendant,
however, the competing policy interests tip in favor of the defendant, 27 something
that was clearly evident in Woodard.'28
IV. THE CONFUSION OF WELCOMENESS AND SUBJECTIVITY
Some commentators assert that the welcomeness requirement is "intrusive,
irrelevant, damaging, and needlessly discourages legitimate sexual harassment
claims."'" Others claim that while welcomeness should be maintained, the burden of
proof should be shifted from the plaintiffto the defendant. 30 A careful understanding
of the multiple issues, as well as the underlying harms of sexual harassment, however,
supports the conclusion that the inquiry into welcomeness, without shifting the
burden of proof, is necessary in order to maintain fairness to defendants and allow
for a more equitable adjudication.
A. The Anti-Welcomeness Camp
The primary objection to the welcomeness requirement is that "courts have made
liberal use of a complainant's 'general character and past behavior towards others'
despite ... [the fact] that this kind of evidence has 'limited, if any probative
124. Id. at *7-8.
125. Id. at *9; see also Howard, 177 F.RID. at 53.
126. Howard, 177 F.R.D. at 53.
127. FED. R. EviD. 412(b)(2). Rule 412(b)(2) states that "evidence offered to prove the
sexual ... predisposition ... is admissible if... its probative value substantially outweighs ...
[the] unfair prejudice to any party." Id. The balancing test portion of Rule 412 applies to civil
cases and can be read in light ofRule4l2(b)(1)(B) which states that in criminal cases, evidence
of conduct between the defendant and alleged victim "is admissible ... to prove consent." Id.
(emphasis added).
128. Woodard, 2000 WL 684101, at *7 (explaining that evidence ofthe plaintiffs repeated
outward manifestation at the workplace of her sexual proclivity should be admitted, because
excluding it "would not 'comport with [Rule 412's] underlying purpose' of protecting a
plaintiff's privacy.") (quoting Fedio v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. 97-5851, 1998 WL
966000, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 1998)).
129. Joan S. Weiner, Note, Understanding Unwelcomeness in Sexual Harassment Law: Its
History and a Proposalfor Reform, 72 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 621, 621 (1997).
130. See, e.g., Mary F. Radford, By Invitation Only: The Proof of Welcomeness in Sexual
Harassment Cases, 72 N.C. L. REV. 499, 526 (1994).
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value,"".''' which has the effect of "putting the sixual harassment plaintiffon trial."'-
In doing so, women who have engaged in any kind of sexual banter in the workplace,
even if done in an attempt to blend into a male-dominated work force, "are deemed
to have incited and prompted any sexual harassment they suffer." 33 This inquiry also
encourages the courts to think about sexual harassment in terms of sexual desire,
ignoring the fact that in many instances the woman will be in a politically and
economically disadvantaged position.'3 Thus, the power relations would prevent her
from being able to expressly decline such advances.' As a result, welcomeness has
the added "effect of teaching harassers that they may do or say anything sexual to
anyone until they are told to stop."'36
Other critics of welcomeness have suggested that, if not eliminated altogether,
"welcomeness [should] be characterized as an affirmative defense rather than as an
element of the plaintiff's prima facie case."'37 Such a step would shift the burden of
proof from the plaintiff to the defendant. In so doing, the defendant would have to
prove the plaintiff welcomed his advances, as opposed to the plaintiff proving the
advances were unwelcome. The major proponent of this theory argues that this is
necessary as a bare minimum, because proving a legal negative is far more difficult
than proving the opposite."
The majority of the anti-welcomeness camp, however, would rather eliminate the
requirement. According to this view, continuing to "[impose] a duty to warn of
unwelcomeness . . . reinforces the conveitional, repressive view of women's
sexualitythatpervades the law of sexual harassment."'3 These commentators suggest
that since "Title VII is not a 'fault-based tort scheme[,]' ... [o]nly evidence relating
to the cause and effect of the [defendant's] conduct is probative to the issue. The
defendant's belief that his conduct was welcome.., should be irrelevant[,]'" thus
doing away with the inquiry altogether.
131. Weiner, supra note 129, at 628 (quoting EEOC, Policy Guidance on Current Issues
of Sexual Harassment, EEOC Notice No. 915-035 (Oct. 25, 1998)).
132. Id. at 626.
133. Id. at 631.
134. See infra note 165 and accompanying text. This is one of the arguments in favor of
shifting the burden of proof of welcomeness from the plaintiff to the defendant. See Radford,
supra note 130. In quid pro quo sexual harassment cases, the employer is strictly liable for
supervisors who sexually harass employees, something which implicitly takes into account the
power relations of the workers. Whatever the merits of that argument might be, it does not
necessarily follow that the burden of proof should be shifted in all sexual harassment claims.
As a practical matter, in enforcing sexual harassment policies in the workplace, one could deal
with the power issue and not change the burden of proof by requiring the "scared" employee
to complain or talk to someone, and that someone can give the notice.
135. Weiner, supra note 129, at 634.
136. Id. at 649.
137. Radford, supra note 130, at 525.
138. Id. at 526.
139. Monnin, supra note 7, at 1191.
140. Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She Askfor It?: The "Unwelcome" Requirement in Sexual
Harassment Cases, 77 CoRNELL L. REV. 1558, 1591 (1992).
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B. Guarding Against Ourselves as Monsters-Narrowing
and Maintaining the Welcomeness Inquiry
While the welcomeness inquiry does shift the focus back to the plaintiff's conduct,
such a result is desirable when limited in scope and aided by Rule 412. Using
Howard and Woodard as examples of the correct application of both the
welcomeness standard and Rule 412, the inquiry is properly focused on the personal
dynamics between the harasser and the plaintiff. This approach seems to provide a
more equitable solution to all involved. The defendants must be able to refute the
elements of the claim, and the plaintiff must be shielded from unnecessary and overly
intrusive inquiries into her past sexual conduct
Doing away with the welcomeness requirement would have the effect of creating
a workplace code of conduct, an outcome outside the scope of Title VII. In order to
shield themselves from claims of sexual harassment, even if the conduct were in fact
welcomed, coworkers and employees would have to monitor interactions with each
other and adhere to a judicially enforced "civility code."'' While the Supreme Court
was quick to emphasize in its decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services.,
Inc.,"2 that it was in fact not creating a workplace code of conduct, stating that Title
VII did not extend its reach to "innocuous" behavior," 3 that conclusion does not
resonate: "[T]he opinion [in Oncale] is nothing less than notice to employers that if
employees behave badly enough, the federal judiciarywill take on the role of manners
police."'" While in theory this may not seem like such abad idea, given how litigious
our society is, coupled with the inherent messiness of sexual harassment suits,
employees and coworkers would be coerced into policing their speech and behavior,
lest they should face the policing effects of a law suit."5 In some ways, this concern
of a workplace code of conduct is the fundamental concern of Title VII: it governs
private interactions between private parties, and the ultimate question is how far do
we entangle the judiciary into what some may see as that purely private sphere. 46
141. Dabney D. Ware & Bradley R. Johnson, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Seres., Inc.:
Perverted Behavior Leads to a Perverse Ruling, 51 FLA. L. REv. 489, 504,508-09 (1999); see
also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998).
142. 523 U.S. 75 (ruling that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable). For a more detailed
discussion of same-sex sexual harassment and the various approaches of the courts as well as
potential approaches, see Dr. Arjun P. Aggarwal & Madhu M. Gupta, Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment: Is it Sex Discrimination?: A Review of Canadian and American Law, 27 MAN.
L.J. 333 (2000); Brian Lehman, The Equal Protection Problem in Sexual Harassment
Doctrine, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 125 (2000); Shelby Jean, Comment, Peer Sexual
Harassment Since Oncale and Davis: Taking the "Sex" Out of "Sexual Harassment, " 2000
DET. C.L. REV. 485; Miguel Nieves, Comment, Joseph Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc.: Redefining Workplace Sexual Harassment to Include Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment and the Effect on Employers, 34 NEW ENG. L. REv. 941 (2000).
143. Id. at 81.
144. Ware & Johnson, supra note 141, at 490.
145. Cf. infra note 160 and accompanying text.
146. Cf. Robert Brookins, A Rose by Any Other Name... The Gender Basis of Same-Sex
Sexual Harassment, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 441,494 (1998) ("[T]he Court forecasted that it will
narrowly construe 'because of sex' to avoid converting Title VII into a 'general civility code'
thatsanctions 'acceptable'conduct, as well as conduct in the 'twilight zone' of the permissible
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Maintaining and narrowing the welcomeness inquiry, coupled with the evidentiary
guidance of Rule 412, serves the interests of maintaining equity for the defendant,
shielding the plaintiff from unnecessary intrusion, and avoiding a workplace code of
conduct The inquirybecomes simply whether the plaintiffwelcomed the complained-
of conduct. In analyzing what evidence may be admitted to determine that inquiry,
courts will necessarily be guided by the balancing of Rule 412.
The question, "Were the advances welcome?" does not necessarily have to focus
exclusively on the sexual aspect of the advances, unlike in Reed. 47 Perhaps the
plaintiff in Reed did engage in sexual banter, and even welcomed a minimum amount,
but that does not mean that she welcomed the level of harassment that she received. 4"
As a result, in focusing on the welcomeness requirement, the courts will have to
distinguish between what the plaintiff reasonably anticipated in return and what was
actually received.
A strict interpretation of Rule 412 would ask exactly what evidence should be
admitted that goes to show the interactions between the plaintiff and the harasser. In
interpreting when the "probative value substantially outweighs the danger ofharm,"4
the courts should be, guided by the language of Rule 412 that deals with criminal
trials: "evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim with
respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct offered by the accused to
prove consent"'15 shall be admissible. This statutory guidance would focus the
probative value inquiry on the relationship between the plaintiff and the alleged
harasser and tend to exclude all other sexual behavior as either irrelevant or highly
prejudicial.
If the plaintiff engaged in friendly sexual banter with the harasser, and the harasser
reciprocated in kind, then the harassment cannot be said to be unwelcome, as a person
could reasonably mistake such banter as inviting the like in return. However, if the
plaintiff engages in friendly sexual banter with the harasser and the harasser responds
with physical advances or banter escalated in nature, then the question of
welcomeness is more complex. At this point the duty could reasonably fall on the
plaintiff to inform the harasser that such escalated behavior is neither welcome nor
wanted. In no situation could a harasser reasonably rely on conduct that did not
involve him directly or on conduct occurring outside of the workplace, because to do
so would assume that because an individual welcomed the advances and sexual
conduct of one person she necessarily welcomed the sexual advances of all.'
In contrast, looking at the plaintiff's behavior outside of the context of the specific
relationship under the guise of serving the policy goals of Rule 412 seems
disingenuous.' When the courts talk about undermining the purpose of Rule 412 by
and impermissible.") (emphasis added) (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523
U.S. 75 (1998)).
147. Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 486-87 (7th Cir. 1991).
148. See also Monnin, supra note 7, at 1179-80 ("By resorting to violence, the defendant
belies any claim that his sexual advances were welcome.").
149. FED. R. Evm. 412(b)(2).
150. FED. R. EviD. 412(b)(1)(B).
151. See Howard v. Historic Tours of Am., 177 F.R.D. 48,52-53 (D.D.C. 1997).
152. See Fedio v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. Civ.A.97-5851, 1998 WL 966000, at *6
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 1998) ("To allow an alleged victim to publicly flaunt her sexual behaviors
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"[allowing] an alleged victim to publicly flaunt her sexual behaviors and [still retain
the protection of] Rule 412,"' 5 they are punishing anyone who dares to be a sexual
being in the workplace towards specific individuals yet spurns the advances of one
or two.' If the sexual banter is between the plaintiff and the alleged harasser, then
its probative value outweighs any potential for harm or unfair prejudice.5 In fact, it
is highly relevant to what the two individuals were thinking"s and perceiving as
welcomed behavior. Beyond that immediate relationship, not only does examining
sexual banter in the workplace generally not provide the requisite level of probative
value that must be had to meet the rigors of Rule 412, it also does not comply with
sound reasoning.' Allowing the courts to examine workplace conduct generally
imposes an unrealistic expectation of purity' upon plaintiffs and has the effect of
creating a workplace code of conduct, something that courts are neither equipped nor
well suited to do." 9
Another benefit under this analysis is that the sexual aspect of the hostile work
environment is minimized, and the inquiry is simply whether the plaintiff welcomed
the complained-of conduct. Thus, courts are forced to acknowledge and analyze the
personal dynamics and power relations on a micro level, and to avoid the problems
of creating a workplace "code of conduct."'" Instead, the code of conduct would be
enforced only as between the plaintiff and the harasser, and it would be up to the
plaintiff to have established clear boundaries and set her own limits with that
particular individual, leavingthepossibilitythat she maywelcome andwishto engage
in a sexual dialogue with other people in the workplace. Using Reed as an example,
the plaintiff did engage in and welcome some sexual banter with some of her
coworkers.' In so doing, however, she did not necessarily welcome the behavior that
and yet remain protected by Rule 412 would be tantamount to a complete disregard of the
rule's purpose.").
153. Id.
154. See e.g., Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that the plaintiff
welcomed extreme physical and sexual harassment because she engaged in sexual banter and
gift giving); supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text. But see Howard, 177 F.R.D. at 52.
155. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(B) (stating that in criminal cases "evidence of specific
instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim with respect to the person accused of the
sexual misconduct offered by the accused to prove consent" is admissible).
156. Or it could be probative of what they were not thinking, depending on your level of
cynicism.
157. See Howard, 177 F.R.D. at 53 (referring to as "hopelessly illogical" the proposition
that because a woman welcomes the advances of one person she necessarily welcomes the
advances of all).
158. See e.g., Gallagherv. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338 (2dCir. 1998). In perhaps themost chaste
sexual harassment suit to date, the alleged harasser purchased for his secretary roses, teddy
bears, "and a book about angels." Id. at 344. While it could be argued that if all sexually
charged work atmospheres were this benign and chaste, working relations might improve, that
is probably a highly unrealistic expectation or accurate portrait of what actually occurs in the
workplace.
159. Id. at 342 ("A federal judge is not in the best position to define the current sexual tenor
of American cultures in their many manifestations.").
160. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
161. Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484,486-87 (7th Cir. 1991); see also supra notes 59-67 and
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she received in return from the defendants. By failing to narrow the inquiry to the
specific conductbetween theplaintiffand the alleged harassers, the court erroneously
focused on the sexual desire aspect of sexual harassment. Forcing courts to focus
exclusively on welcomeness limits the relevance of sexual desire.
Most hostile work environment sexual harassment claims are not about sexual
desire. Rather, they illustrate how sexuality can be used as a tool of power "to hurt
people physically, to denigrate or humiliate people, to deny them their equal
opportunity in employment, or otherwise to make an environment hostile or
uncomfortable." '162 Thus, focusing exclusively on conduct that occurs between the
plaintiff and the defendant, it should become apparent that "[w]elcomeness is not an
issue when [sexually aggressive] conduct occurs[,] because it is purely reflective of
power."'63 This is not to say that there is no element of desire in some cases.
However, when the focus of the judicial investigation becomes the specific actions
of the plaintiff and the defendant with respect to each other, the natural elements of
power should become more evident. This also makes the focus on welcomeness that
much more important. One can imagine that if the alleged harasser were the
plaintiff's supervisor, then the plaintiff might not be as readily able to clearly state
that she does not welcome the harasser's advances. A court, looking at whether the
defendant's aggressive conduct was welcomed, should examine the power relations
between the two parties, in addition to examining the plaintiff's failure to clearly state
her lack of receptivity. "' In the situation in which the alleged harasser is a coworker,
the court will also examine the parties' respective power relations, and more than
likely will conclude that the plaintiff in that situation will have a greater duty to
affirmatively state her lack of receptiveness.
Additionally, simply maintaining the welcomeness inquiry and shifting the burden
of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant is simply not feasible. 65 Because
workplace sexual relations, whether they are welcomed or not, can often be subtle
and complex, even if the defendant had to prove welcomeness (as opposed to
unwelcomeness), there would still be the problems contemplated by Rule 412: the
defendant would seek to admit evidence of the plaintiffs sexually provocative
behavior; regardless of whether the plaintiff's behavior was directed specifically at
him. Having the defendant prove the welcomeness of his sexually suggestive conduct
would not in any meaningful way detract from the damaging nature of the evidence
he will try to introduce to the court. In addition, this would most certainly create a
workplace "code of conduct" in which the defendant must specifically ask and
receive permission for every* comment or gesture that might have any sexual
accompanying text.
162. Radford, supra note 130, at 542.
163. Monnin, supra note 7, at 1179-80.
164. Maintaining the welcomeness requirement as it is would arguably require the plaintiff
to affirmatively state her disapproval to any would-be harassers. Radford, supra note 130, at
546. That argument is based on the assumptioh that plaintiffs are completely powerless in
controlling their situations. See id. at 539. However, if courts were to take into account
differing levels of power and control, as they presumably already do in quid pro quo suits, this
would not be an insurmountable problem.
165. But see Radford, supra note 130, at 526.
[Vol. 77:615
WELCOMENESS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT SUITS
overtones.' 66
With Rule 412, -the ultimate burden of proving unwelcomeness lies with the
plaintiff, and any evidence that the defendant wishes to introduce that would rebut the
plaintiff's accusation would fall under Rule 412, and for that specific evidence, the
defendant would have to prove the prescribed balancing test.67 Thus, the overall
burden of proving unwelcomeness would still lie with the plaintiff. This serves to
protect the interests of the plaintiff, limiting the admissible evidence under Rule 412
to the relevant conduct that occurred specificallybetween the plaintiff and defendant
only, while also requiring the plaintiff to take a more affirmative role in her
workplace environment.' In so placing and maintaining this overall burden ofproof
with the plaintiff, the element of subjective offensiveness, which some courts have
interpreted as a subcomponent of welcomeness, must be reanalyzed.
C. The "Subjectively Offended" Requirement
In Harris v. Forklift Systems,169 the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs in sexual
harassment cases need not demonstrate psychological or other serious injury in order
to state an actionable claimunder Title VII. n ° The Court stated that the standard was
one that "takes a middle path between making actionable any conduct which is merely
offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury."'' The
Court continued, however, stating that "if the victim [did] not subjectively perceive
the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of
the victim's employment, and there is no Title VII violation."'" As a result of this
decision, many lower courts have adopted a second prong within the welcomeness
inquiry: Was the plaintiff subjectively offended by the alleged harasser's actions? 73
1. Defining the "Subjectively Offended" Requirement
In answering the question posed in Harris, the Court stated that Title VII required
a middle-ground approach, reasoning that harassment that does not rise to the level
of psychological injury can affect the terms and conditions of employment.174 The
166. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text. Fear of liability drove at least one
institution of higher learning to implement just such a policy for dealing with sexual
harassment. See, e.g., Daphne Patai, 1990's Faculty Fundamentalism and AcademicFreedom:
There Ought to be a Law, 22 WM. MrTCHELLL. REV. 491 (1996) (discussing the current trend
to cleanse and sanitize culture in conjunction with the University ofMassachusets-Amherst's
proposed sexual harassment policy).
167. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
168. While there is some valid concern that "[i]f a woman does indeed lodge a complaint
with heremployer... she may risk further harassment orretaliation," such retaliation is covered
under Title VII and beyond the scope of this Note. Monnin, supra note 7, at 1179.
169. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
170. Id. at21.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 21-22.
173. See, e.g., Fedio v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. Civ.A.97-5851, 1998 WL 966000, at
*6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 1998).
174. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.
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Court stressed, however, the fact that the conduct complained of cannot simply be
offensive. Rather, it must rise to the level of affecting the terms and conditions of
employment, and the plaintiff must find it subjectively offensive. In determining
whether the plaintiff was subjectively offended, the Court was not asking whether the
plaintiff was offended by the words or actions used. Instead, the Court was
concerned that the plaintiff demonstrate that she was offended by the conduct as
directed at her: that she did not welcome the conduct. Finding the complained-of
conduct unwelcome and having it rise to the level of affecting a term or condition of
her employment will necessarily involve some level of subjective offensiveness,
regardless of whether the specific conduct used offended her moral sensibilities.
2. Why Being Subjectively Offended Is an Erroneous Inquiry
The result of "[creating] a two-part standard for unwelcome sexual conduct...
[defining] unwelcome sexual conduct as conduct that the employee did not solicit or
incite, and that is undesirable or offensive to the [plaintiff]'" ' is that courts are
failing to realize that whether the plaintiff was subjectively offended is irrelevant to
whether the plaintiff welcomed the defendant's sexual advances. It is entirely
possible that a plaintiff would not be subjectively offended by crude sexual remarks,
and may even engage in such conduct herself with other coworkers, and yet may still
perceive such remarks from the defendant as being unwelcome, even if she does not
find them offensive.
A prime example of the misinterpretation of Harris' subjectively offended criteria
is Fedio v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.17 Despite the circular logic'" the court applied
in deciding the case, it is disturbing that a court would allow a hostile work
environment sexual harassment case to turn on how much or "how little [the]
[p]laintiff would be offended by... alleged sexual innuendos,"' ' as opposed to
looking at the greater issue of whether those advances were welcomed and how they
affected the plaintiffs status and performance in the workplace. While the
welcomeness requirement is also a subjective inquiry to a degree, the "subjectively
offended requirement" looks at whether the plaintiffwas offendedby the conduct, not
whether the conduct was welcomed. If the welcomeness requirement is warped into
a "subjectively offended requirement," sexual harassment suits would be defeated any
time aparticularplaintiffhad previously engaged in sexual banter with someone other
than the defendant using similar language or actions. 179 The real issue is whether the
defendant's conduct was welcomed, not whether the plaintiff was subjectively
offended by the remarks in and of themselves. In asking that question of a defendant,
175. Monnin, supra note 7, at 1164-65 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897
(11 th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added)). While the decision in Henson was prior to both Meritor
and the 1994 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, some courts have continued to
follow this approach. See Fedio, 1998 WL 966000, at *6; see also supra notes 174-75 and
accompanying text.
176. No. Civ.A.97-5851, 1998 WL 966000 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 1998).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 82, 93-95.
178. Fedio, 1998 WL 966000, at *6 (emphasis added).
179. This is so because at that point in time, it could not be said that the plaintiff was
subjectively offended by the words or actions used by the defendant.
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however, it will rarely, if ever, be answered in the negative. As a result, the question,
out of necessity, must shift back to the plaintiff, as well as the defendant, and focus
on their interactions together, excluding subjective perceptions of offensiveness. If
the complained of conduct was not welcomed by the plaintiff and that conduct rises
to the level of affecting a term or condition of employment, then the subjectively
offended prong will naturally be satisfied, thus avoiding the potential pitfalls in
irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence.
V. CONCLUSION
To the extent the courts think sexual harassment is about sexual desire, it is
understandable that there would be confusion over what evidence is admissible to
demonstrate a plaintiffs welcomeness. However, this emphasis on sexual desire
coupled with all-out inquiries into a plaintiffs past sexual conduct to prove
unwelcomeness is not correct. While many commentators would do away with the
welcomeness requirement completely, such conclusions are a little rash and would
not satisfactorily balance all of the competing policy interests. Simply because some
courts have "done a bad job of differentiating welcome from unwelcome sexual
conduct," 8' we need not declare all conduct unwelcome or abandon the welcomeness
requirement altogether.
There are many problems with the standard as it is currently being employed in
certain courts. While Rule 412 was amended, in part, to add clarity and guidance to
an area of law that desperately needed it after Meritor, it has provided little such
guidance.' Instead, it has validated the relevance of general workplace conduct of
plaintiffs and has left the decision of admissibility where it had been initially: in the
trial judge's discretion.'
Nevertheless, some courts, with the help of Rule 412 are taking steps in the correct
direction. These courts are focusing only on the conductbetween the plaintiff and the
defendant, looking at whether the plaintiff targeted her alleged welcoming behavior
specifically at the defendant, so that he could later reasonably perceive his sexually
aggressive conduct as having been invited. In so doing, the courts will not only be
able to get a better sense of the power relations that exist between the plaintiff and
her aggressors, but will be able to avoid creating a workplace "code of conduct,"
something which is not only undesirable, but also unrealistic.
180. Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691,
746 (1997).
181. See supra Part II.
182. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note (citing Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus.,
Inc., 989 F.2d 959,962-63 (8th Cir. 1993)).
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